Current File : /var/lib/snapd/apparmor/profiles/snap.thunderbird.hook.configure
# vim:syntax=apparmor
#include <tunables/global>
#include if exists "/var/lib/snapd/apparmor/snap-tuning"
# snapd supports the concept of 'parallel installs' where snaps with the same
# name are differentiated by '_<instance>' such that foo, foo_bar and foo_baz
# may all be installed on the system. To support this, SNAP_NAME is set to the
# name (eg, 'foo') while SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME is set to the instance name (eg
# 'foo_bar'). The profile name and most rules therefore reference
# SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME. In some cases, snapd will adjust the snap's runtime
# environment so the snap doesn't have to be aware of the distinction (eg,
# SNAP, SNAP_DATA and SNAP_COMMON are all bind mounted onto a directory with
# SNAP_NAME so the security policy will allow writing to both locations (since
# they are equivalent).
# This is a snap name without the instance key
@{SNAP_NAME}="thunderbird"
# This is a snap name with instance key
@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}="thunderbird"
@{SNAP_INSTANCE_DESKTOP}="thunderbird"
@{SNAP_COMMAND_NAME}="hook.configure"
@{SNAP_REVISION}="532"
@{PROFILE_DBUS}="snap_2ethunderbird_2ehook_2econfigure"
@{INSTALL_DIR}="/{,var/lib/snapd/}snap"
profile "snap.thunderbird.hook.configure" flags=(attach_disconnected,mediate_deleted) {
#include <abstractions/base>
#include <abstractions/consoles>
#include <abstractions/openssl>
# While in later versions of the base abstraction, include this explicitly
# for series 16 and cross-distro
/etc/ld.so.preload r,
# The base abstraction doesn't yet have this
/etc/sysconfig/clock r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/maps k,
# /proc/XXXX/map_files contains the same info than /proc/XXXX/maps, but
# in a format that is simpler to manage, because it doesn't require to
# parse the text data inside a file, but just reading the contents of
# a directory.
# Reading /proc/XXXX/maps is already allowed in the base template
# via <abstractions/base>. Also, only the owner can read it, and the
# kernel limits access to it by requiring 'ptrace' enabled, so allowing
# to access /proc/XXXX/map_files can be considered secure too.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/map_files/ r,
# While the base abstraction has rules for encryptfs encrypted home and
# private directories, it is missing rules for directory read on the toplevel
# directory of the mount (LP: #1848919)
owner @{HOME}/.Private/ r,
owner @{HOMEDIRS}/.ecryptfs/*/.Private/ r,
# for python apps/services
#include <abstractions/python>
/etc/python3.[0-9]*/** r,
# explicitly deny noisy denials to read-only filesystems (see LP: #1496895
# for details)
deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/ w,
deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/**.pyc.[0-9]* w,
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**/__pycache__/ w,
deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**/__pycache__/*.pyc.[0-9]* w,
# for perl apps/services
#include <abstractions/perl>
# Missing from perl abstraction
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/auto/**.so* mr,
# Note: the following dangerous accesses should not be allowed in most
# policy, but we cannot explicitly deny since other trusted interfaces might
# add them.
# Explicitly deny ptrace for now since it can be abused to break out of the
# seccomp sandbox. https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/18/823
#audit deny ptrace (trace),
# Explicitly deny capability mknod so apps can't create devices
#audit deny capability mknod,
# Explicitly deny mount, remount and umount so apps can't modify things in
# their namespace
#audit deny mount,
#audit deny remount,
#audit deny umount,
# End dangerous accesses
# Note: this potentially allows snaps to DoS other snaps via resource
# exhaustion but we can't sensibly mediate this today. In the future we may
# employ cgroup limits, AppArmor rlimit mlock rules or something else.
capability ipc_lock,
# for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
# user-specific bash files
/etc/bash.bashrc r,
/etc/inputrc r,
/etc/environment r,
/etc/profile r,
# user/group/seat lookups
/etc/{passwd,group,nsswitch.conf} r, # very common
/var/lib/extrausers/{passwd,group} r,
/run/systemd/users/[0-9]* r,
/etc/default/nss r,
# libnss-systemd (subset from nameservice abstraction)
#
# https://systemd.io/USER_GROUP_API/
# https://systemd.io/USER_RECORD/
# https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-systemd.html
#
# Allow User/Group lookups via common VarLink socket APIs. Applications need
# to either consult all of them or the io.systemd.Multiplexer frontend.
/run/systemd/userdb/ r,
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Multiplexer rw,
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.DynamicUser rw, # systemd-exec users
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Home rw, # systemd-home dirs
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.NameServiceSwitch rw, # UNIX/glibc NSS
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Machine rw, # systemd-machined
/etc/libnl-3/{classid,pktloc} r, # apps that use libnl
# For snappy reexec on 4.8+ kernels
/usr/lib/snapd/snap-exec m,
# For gdb support
/usr/lib/snapd/snap-gdb-shim ixr,
/usr/lib/snapd/snap-gdbserver-shim ixr,
# For in-snap tab completion
/etc/bash_completion.d/{,*} r,
/usr/lib/snapd/etelpmoc.sh ixr, # marshaller (see complete.sh for out-of-snap unmarshal)
/usr/share/bash-completion/bash_completion r, # user-provided completions (run in-snap) may use functions from here
# uptime
@{PROC}/uptime r,
@{PROC}/loadavg r,
# Allow reading /etc/os-release. On Ubuntu 16.04+ it is a symlink to /usr/lib
# which is allowed by the base abstraction, but on 14.04 it is an actual file
# so need to add it here. Also allow read locks on the file.
/etc/os-release rk,
/usr/lib/os-release k,
# systemd native journal API (see sd_journal_print(4)). This should be in
# AppArmor's base abstraction, but until it is, include here. We include
# the base journal path as well as the journal namespace pattern path. Each
# journal namespace for quota groups will be prefixed with 'snap-'.
/run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/socket w,
/run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/stdout rw, # 'r' shouldn't be needed, but journald
# doesn't leak anything so allow
# snapctl and its requirements
/usr/bin/snapctl ixr,
/usr/lib/snapd/snapctl ixr,
@{PROC}/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,
/run/snapd-snap.socket rw,
# Note: for now, don't explicitly deny this noisy denial so --devmode isn't
# broken but eventually we may conditionally deny this since it is an
# information leak.
#deny /{,var/}run/utmp r,
# java
@{PROC}/@{pid}/ r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/fd/ r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/auxv r,
@{PROC}/sys/vm/zone_reclaim_mode r,
/etc/lsb-release r,
/sys/devices/**/read_ahead_kb r,
/sys/devices/system/cpu/** r,
/sys/devices/system/node/node[0-9]*/* r,
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled r,
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/defrag r,
# NOTE: this leaks running process but java seems to want it (even though it
# seems to operate ok without it) and SDL apps crash without it. Allow owner
# match until AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly (see
# LP: #1546825 for details). comm is a subset of cmdline, so allow it too.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cmdline r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/comm r,
# Per man(5) proc, the kernel enforces that a thread may only modify its comm
# value or those in its thread group.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/@{tid}/comm rw,
# Allow reading and writing to our file descriptors in /proc which, for
# example, allow access to /dev/std{in,out,err} which are all symlinks to
# /proc/self/fd/{0,1,2} respectively. To support the open(..., O_TMPFILE)
# linkat() temporary file technique, allow all fds. Importantly, access to
# another task's fd via this proc interface is mediated via 'ptrace (read)'
# (readonly) and 'ptrace (trace)' (read/write) which is denied by default, so
# this rule by itself doesn't allow opening another snap's fds via proc.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/{,task/@{tid}}fd/[0-9]* rw,
# Miscellaneous accesses
/dev/{,u}random w,
/etc/machine-id r,
/etc/mime.types r,
/etc/default/keyboard r,
@{PROC}/ r,
@{PROC}/version r,
@{PROC}/version_signature r,
/etc/{,writable/}hostname r,
/etc/{,writable/}localtime r,
/etc/{,writable/}mailname r,
/etc/{,writable/}timezone r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cgroup rk,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/cpuset r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/io r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/limits r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/loginuid r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/smaps r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/stat r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/statm r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/status r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/ r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/smaps r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/stat r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/statm r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/status r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/pipe-max-size r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/hostname r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/osrelease r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/ostype r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/shmmax r,
# Allow apps to introspect the level of dbus mediation AppArmor implements.
/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/dbus/mask r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/file-max r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/file-nr r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/inotify/max_* r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/boot_id r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/uuid r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap r,
# Allow access to the uuidd daemon (this daemon is a thin wrapper around
# time and getrandom()/{,u}random and, when available, runs under an
# unprivilged, dedicated user).
/run/uuidd/request rw,
/sys/devices/virtual/tty/{console,tty*}/active r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,user.slice/}memory.limit_in_bytes r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.limit_in_bytes r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.stat r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,user.slice/}cpu.cfs_{period,quota}_us r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/cpu.cfs_{period,quota}_us r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,user.slice/}cpu.shares r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/cpu.shares r,
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hpage_pmd_size r,
/sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled r,
/{,usr/}lib/ r,
# Reads of oom_adj and oom_score_adj are safe
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_{,score_}adj r,
# Note: for now, don't explicitly deny write access so --devmode isn't broken
# but eventually we may conditionally deny this since it allows the process
# to increase the oom heuristic of other processes (make them more likely to
# be killed). Once AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly,
# this can safely be allowed since non-root processes won't be able to
# decrease the value and root processes will only be able to with
# 'capability sys_resource,' which we deny be default.
# deny owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_{,score_}adj w,
# Eases hardware assignment (doesn't give anything away)
/etc/udev/udev.conf r,
/sys/ r,
/sys/bus/ r,
/sys/class/ r,
# this leaks interface names and stats, but not in a way that is traceable
# to the user/device
@{PROC}/net/dev r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/net/dev r,
# Read-only of this snap
/var/lib/snapd/snaps/@{SNAP_NAME}_*.snap r,
# Read-only of snapd restart state for snapctl specifically
/var/lib/snapd/maintenance.json r,
# Read-only for the install directory
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
@{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/ r,
@{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}}/ r,
@{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}}/** mrklix,
# Read-only install directory for other revisions to help with bugs like
# LP: #1616650 and LP: #1655992
@{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/** mrkix,
# Read-only home area for other versions
# bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ r,
owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrkix,
# Experimental snap folder changes
owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ r,
owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrkix,
owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/common/** wl,
owner @{HOME}/Snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ r,
owner @{HOME}/Snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrkixwl,
# Writable home area for this version.
# bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/common/** wl,
# Read-only system area for other versions
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
/var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/ r,
/var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/** mrkix,
# Writable system area only for this version
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
/var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
/var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/common/** wl,
# The ubuntu-core-launcher creates an app-specific private restricted /tmp
# and will fail to launch the app if something goes wrong. As such, we can
# simply allow full access to /tmp.
/tmp/ r,
/tmp/** mrwlkix,
# App-specific access to files and directories in /dev/shm. We allow file
# access in /dev/shm for shm_open() and files in subdirectories for open()
# bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
/{dev,run}/shm/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.** mrwlkix,
# Also allow app-specific access for sem_open()
/{dev,run}/shm/sem.snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.* mrwlk,
# Snap-specific XDG_RUNTIME_DIR that is based on the UID of the user
# bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,
# Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via an
# abstract or anonymous socket
unix (bind, listen) addr="@snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.**",
unix peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*),
# Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via DBus.
# Note: this does not grant access to the DBus sockets of well known buses
# (will still need to use an appropriate interface for that).
dbus (receive, send) peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*),
# In addition to the above, dbus-run-session attempts reading these files
# from the snap base runtime.
/usr/share/dbus-1/services/{,*} r,
/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/{,*} r,
# Allow apps to perform DBus introspection on org.freedesktop.DBus for both
# the system and session buses.
# Note: this does not grant access to the DBus sockets of these buses, but
# we grant it here since it is missing from the dbus abstractions
# (LP: #1866168)
dbus (send)
bus={session,system}
path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
member=Introspect
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow apps from the same package to signal each other via signals
signal peer=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*,
# Allow receiving signals from all snaps (and focus on mediating sending of
# signals)
signal (receive) peer=snap.*,
# Allow receiving signals from unconfined (eg, systemd)
signal (receive) peer=unconfined,
# for 'udevadm trigger --verbose --dry-run --tag-match=snappy-assign'
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/udevadm ixr,
/etc/udev/udev.conf r,
/{,var/}run/udev/tags/snappy-assign/ r,
@{PROC}/cmdline r,
/sys/devices/**/uevent r,
# LP: #1447237: adding '--property-match=SNAPPY_APP=<pkgname>' to the above
# requires:
# /run/udev/data/* r,
# but that reveals too much about the system and cannot be granted to apps
# by default at this time.
# For convenience, allow apps to see what is in /dev even though cgroups
# will block most access
/dev/ r,
/dev/**/ r,
# Allow setting up pseudoterminal via /dev/pts system. This is safe because
# the launcher uses a per-app devpts newinstance.
/dev/ptmx rw,
# Do the same with /sys/devices and /sys/class to help people using hw-assign
/sys/devices/ r,
/sys/devices/**/ r,
/sys/class/ r,
/sys/class/**/ r,
# Allow all snaps to chroot
capability sys_chroot,
# Lttng tracing is very noisy and should not be allowed by confined apps. Can
# safely deny for the normal case (LP: #1260491). If/when an lttng-trace
# interface is needed, we can rework this.
deny /{dev,run,var/run}/shm/lttng-ust-* rw,
# Allow read-access on /home/ for navigating to other parts of the
# filesystem. While this allows enumerating users, this is already allowed
# via /etc/passwd and getent.
@{HOMEDIRS}/ r,
# Allow read-access to / for navigating to other parts of the filesystem.
/ r,
# Snap-specific run directory. Bind mount *not* used here
# (see 'parallel installs', above)
/run/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
/run/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,
# Snap-specific lock directory and prerequisite navigation permissions.
/run/lock/ r,
/run/lock/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
/run/lock/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,
# Default rules for core base runtimes
# The base abstraction doesn't yet have this
/{,usr/}lib/terminfo/** rk,
/usr/share/terminfo/** k,
/usr/share/zoneinfo/** k,
# for python apps/services
/usr/bin/python{,2,2.[0-9]*,3,3.[0-9]*} ixr,
# additional accesses needed for newer pythons in later bases
/usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/**.{pyc,so} mr,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/**.{egg,py,pth} r,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/{site,dist}-packages/ r,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/lib-dynload/*.so mr,
/usr/include/python3.[0-9]*/pyconfig.h r,
# for perl apps/services
/usr/bin/perl{,5*} ixr,
# AppArmor <2.12 doesn't have rules for perl-base, so add them here
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/** r,
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/[0-9]*/**.so* mr,
# for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
# user-specific bash files
/{,usr/}bin/bash ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dash ixr,
/usr/share/terminfo/** r,
# Common utilities for shell scripts
/{,usr/}bin/arch ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/{,g,m}awk ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/base32 ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/base64 ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/basename ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bunzip2 ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/busctl ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bzcat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bzdiff ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bzgrep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bzip2 ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/chgrp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/chmod ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/chown ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/clear ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cmp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cpio ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cut ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/date ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dbus-daemon ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dbus-run-session ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dbus-send ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dd ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/diff{,3} ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dir ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dirname ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/du ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/echo ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/{,e,f,r}grep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/env ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/expr ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/false ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/find ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/flock ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/fmt ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/fold ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/getconf ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/getent ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/getopt ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/groups ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/gzip ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/head ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/hostname ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/id ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/igawk ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/infocmp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/kill ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/ldd ixr,
/{usr/,}lib{,32,64}/ld{,32,64}-*.so ix,
/{usr/,}lib/@{multiarch}/ld{,32,64}-*.so* ix,
/{,usr/}bin/less{,file,pipe} ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/ln ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/line ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/link ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/locale ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/logger ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/ls ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/md5sum ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mkdir ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mkfifo ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mknod ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mktemp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/more ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mv ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/nice ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/nohup ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/numfmt ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/od ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/openssl ixr, # may cause harmless capability block_suspend denial
/{,usr/}bin/paste ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/pgrep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/printenv ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/printf ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/ps ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/pwd ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/readlink ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/realpath ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/rev ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/rm ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/rmdir ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/run-parts ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sed ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/seq ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sha{1,224,256,384,512}sum ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/shuf ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sleep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sort ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/stat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/stdbuf ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/stty ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sync ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/systemd-cat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tac ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tail ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tar ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tee ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/test ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tempfile ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tset ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/touch ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tput ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tr ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/true ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tty ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/uname ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/uniq ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/unlink ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/unxz ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/unzip ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/uptime ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/vdir ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/wc ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/which{,.debianutils} ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/xargs ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/xz ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/yes ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/zcat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/z{,e,f}grep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/zip ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/zipgrep ixr,
# lsb-release
/usr/bin/lsb_release ixr,
/usr/bin/ r,
/usr/share/distro-info/*.csv r,
# For printing the cache (we don't allow updating the cache)
/{,usr/}sbin/ldconfig{,.real} ixr,
# Allow all snaps to chroot
/{,usr/}sbin/chroot ixr,
# Description: Can access basic graphical desktop resources. To be used with
# other interfaces (eg, wayland).
#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
#include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>
# Allow finding the DBus session bus id (eg, via dbus_bus_get_id())
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
member=GetId
peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),
#include <abstractions/fonts>
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/fonts/{,**} r,
/var/cache/fontconfig/ r,
/var/cache/fontconfig/** mr,
# some applications are known to mmap fonts
/usr/{,local/}share/fonts/** m,
# Allow access to xdg-document-portal file system. Access control is
# handled by bind mounting a snap-specific sub-tree to this location
# (ie, this is /run/user/<uid>/doc/by-app/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}
# on the host).
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/doc/{,*/} r,
# Allow rw access without owner match to the documents themselves since
# the user guided the access and can specify anything DAC allows.
/run/user/[0-9]*/doc/*/** rw,
# Allow access to xdg-desktop-portal and xdg-document-portal
dbus (receive, send)
bus=session
interface=org.freedesktop.portal.*
path=/org/freedesktop/portal/{desktop,documents}{,/**}
peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (receive, send)
bus=session
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
path=/org/freedesktop/portal/{desktop,documents}{,/**}
peer=(label=unconfined),
# The portals service is normally running and newer versions of
# xdg-desktop-portal include AssumedAppArmor=unconfined. Since older
# systems don't have this and because gtkfilechoosernativeportal.c relies on
# service activation, allow sends to peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.{Desktop,Documents})
# for service activation.
dbus (send)
bus=session
interface=org.freedesktop.portal.*
path=/org/freedesktop/portal/desktop{,/**}
peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Desktop),
dbus (send)
bus=session
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
path=/org/freedesktop/portal/desktop{,/**}
peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Desktop),
dbus (send)
bus=session
interface=org.freedesktop.portal.*
path=/org/freedesktop/portal/documents{,/**}
peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Documents),
dbus (send)
bus=session
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
path=/org/freedesktop/portal/documents{,/**}
peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Documents),
# Allow to get the current idle time only from Mutter
dbus (send)
bus=session
path="/org/gnome/Mutter/IdleMonitor/Core"
interface="org.gnome.Mutter.IdleMonitor"
member="GetIdletime"
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Description: Can access specific personal files or directories in the
# users's home directory.
# This is restricted because it gives file access to arbitrary locations.
owner "@{HOME}/.thunderbird{,/,/**}" rk,
# Description: Can access specific system files or directories.
# This is restricted because it gives file access to arbitrary locations.
"/etc/thunderbird/policies{,/,/**}" rk,
# In addition to the bind mount, add any AppArmor rules so that
# snaps may directly access the slot implementation's files
# read-only.
"/snap/gnome-42-2204/176/**" mrkix,
# In addition to the bind mount, add any AppArmor rules so that
# snaps may directly access the slot implementation's files
# read-only.
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/default/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Adwaita/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/hicolor/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/HighContrast/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Humanity/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Humanity-Dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/ubuntu-mono-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/ubuntu-mono-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/DMZ-Black/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/DMZ-White/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-bark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-blue/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-magenta/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-olive/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-prussiangreen/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-purple/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-red/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-sage/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-viridian/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-bark-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-blue-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-magenta-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-olive-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-prussiangreen-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-purple-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-red-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-sage-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-viridian-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Ambiant-MATE/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Radiant-MATE/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-MATE-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-MATE-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-mate/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-mate-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Adapta-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Adapta-Nokto-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Dark-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Light-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/breeze_cursors/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Breeze_Snow/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary-xfce/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary-xfce-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary-xfce-darker/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary-xfce-darkest/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/handhelds/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/redglass/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/whiteglass/**" mrkix,
# In addition to the bind mount, add any AppArmor rules so that
# snaps may directly access the slot implementation's files
# read-only.
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/sounds/Yaru/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/sounds/freedesktop/**" mrkix,
# In addition to the bind mount, add any AppArmor rules so that
# snaps may directly access the slot implementation's files
# read-only.
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Adwaita/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Adwaita-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/HighContrast/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Ambiance/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Radiance/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Arc/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Arc-Dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Arc-Darker/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Breeze/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Breeze-Dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-bark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-blue/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-magenta/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-olive/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-prussiangreen/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-purple/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-red/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-sage/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-viridian/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-bark-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-blue-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-magenta-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-olive-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-prussiangreen-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-purple-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-red-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-sage-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-viridian-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/elementary/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Ambiant-MATE/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Ambiant-MATE-Dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Radiant-MATE/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-MATE-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-MATE-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-mate/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-mate-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-aliz/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-azul/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-dark-aliz/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-dark-azul/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-dark-sea/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-sea/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Greybird/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Greybird-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-compact/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-dark-compact/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-light-compact/**" mrkix,
# subset of gnome abstraction
/etc/gtk-3.0/settings.ini r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-3.0/settings.ini r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-3.0/*.css r,
# Note: this leaks directory names that wouldn't otherwise be known to the snap
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-3.0/bookmarks r,
/usr/share/icons/ r,
/usr/share/icons/** r,
/usr/share/icons/*/index.theme rk,
/usr/share/pixmaps/ r,
/usr/share/pixmaps/** r,
/usr/share/unity/icons/** r,
/usr/share/thumbnailer/icons/** r,
/usr/share/themes/** r,
# The snapcraft desktop part may look for schema files in various locations, so
# allow reading system installed schemas.
/usr/share/glib*/schemas/{,*} r,
/usr/share/gnome/glib*/schemas/{,*} r,
/usr/share/ubuntu/glib*/schemas/{,*} r,
# subset of freedesktop.org
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/mime/** r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/user-dirs.* r,
/etc/xdg/user-dirs.conf r,
/etc/xdg/user-dirs.defaults r,
# gmenu
dbus (send)
bus=session
interface=org.gtk.Actions
member=Changed
peer=(label=unconfined),
# notifications
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
interface=org.freedesktop.Notifications
member="{GetCapabilities,GetServerInformation,Notify,CloseNotification}"
peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),
dbus (receive)
bus=session
path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
interface=org.freedesktop.Notifications
member={ActionInvoked,NotificationClosed,NotificationReplied}
peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),
# KDE Plasma's Inhibited property indicating "do not disturb" mode
# https://invent.kde.org/plasma/plasma-workspace/-/blob/master/libnotificationmanager/dbus/org.freedesktop.Notifications.xml#L42
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
member="Get{,All}"
peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),
dbus (receive)
bus=session
path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
member=PropertiesChanged
peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),
# DesktopAppInfo Launched
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/org/gtk/gio/DesktopAppInfo
interface=org.gtk.gio.DesktopAppInfo
member=Launched
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow requesting interest in receiving media key events. This tells Gnome
# settings that our application should be notified when key events we are
# interested in are pressed, and allows us to receive those events.
dbus (receive, send)
bus=session
interface=org.gnome.SettingsDaemon.MediaKeys
path=/org/gnome/SettingsDaemon/MediaKeys
peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
bus=session
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
path=/org/gnome/SettingsDaemon/MediaKeys
member="Get{,All}"
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow accessing the GNOME crypto services prompt APIs as used by
# applications using libgcr (such as pinentry-gnome3) for secure pin
# entry to unlock GPG keys etc. See:
# https://developer.gnome.org/gcr/unstable/GcrPrompt.html
# https://developer.gnome.org/gcr/unstable/GcrSecretExchange.html
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/org/gnome/keyring/Prompter
interface=org.gnome.keyring.internal.Prompter
member="{BeginPrompting,PerformPrompt,StopPrompting}"
peer=(label=unconfined),
# While the DBus path is not snap-specific, by the time an application
# registers the prompt path via DBus, Gcr will check that it isn't
# already in use and send the client an error if it is. See:
# https://github.com/snapcore/snapd/pull/7673#issuecomment-592229711
dbus (receive)
bus=session
path=/org/gnome/keyring/Prompt/p[0-9]*
interface=org.gnome.keyring.internal.Prompter.Callback
member="{PromptReady,PromptDone}"
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow use of snapd's internal 'xdg-open'
/usr/bin/xdg-open ixr,
# While /usr/share/applications comes from the base runtime of the snap, it
# has some things that snaps actually need, so allow access to those and deny
# access to the others
/usr/share/applications/ r,
/usr/share/applications/mimeapps.list r,
/usr/share/applications/xdg-open.desktop r,
# silence noisy denials from desktop files in core* snaps that aren't usable by
# snaps
deny /usr/share/applications/python*.desktop r,
deny /usr/share/applications/vim.desktop r,
deny /usr/share/applications/snap-handle-link.desktop r, # core16
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/
interface=com.canonical.SafeLauncher
member=OpenURL
peer=(label=unconfined),
# ... and this allows access to the new xdg-open service which
# is now part of snapd itself.
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/io/snapcraft/Launcher
interface=io.snapcraft.Launcher
member={OpenURL,OpenFile}
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow checking status, activating and locking the screensaver
# gnome/kde/freedesktop.org
dbus (send)
bus=session
path="/{,org/freedesktop/,org/gnome/}ScreenSaver"
interface="org.{freedesktop,gnome}.ScreenSaver"
member="{GetActive,GetActiveTime,Lock,SetActive}"
peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (receive)
bus=session
path="/{,org/freedesktop/,org/gnome/}ScreenSaver"
interface="org.{freedesktop,gnome}.ScreenSaver"
member=ActiveChanged
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow unconfined to introspect us
dbus (receive)
bus=session
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
member=Introspect
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow use of snapd's internal 'xdg-settings'
/usr/bin/xdg-settings ixr,
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/io/snapcraft/Settings
interface=io.snapcraft.Settings
member={Check,CheckSub,Get,GetSub,Set,SetSub}
peer=(label=unconfined),
# These accesses are noisy and applications can't do anything with the found
# icon files, so explicitly deny to silence the denials
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/icons/{,**/} r,
# These accesses occur when flatpaks are on the system since it updates
# XDG_DATA_DIRS to contain $HOME/.local/share/flatpak/exports/share. Until
# we have better XDG_DATA_DIRS handling, silence these noisy denials.
# https://github.com/snapcrafters/discord/issues/23#issuecomment-637607843
deny @{HOME}/.local/share/flatpak/exports/share/** r,
# Allow access to the IBus portal (IBUS_USE_PORTAL=1)
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/org/freedesktop/IBus
interface=org.freedesktop.IBus.Portal
member=CreateInputContext
peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.IBus),
dbus (send, receive)
bus=session
path=/org/freedesktop/IBus/InputContext_[0-9]*
interface=org.freedesktop.IBus.InputContext
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow access to the Fcitx portal, supported by fcitx/fcitx5
dbus (send)
bus=session
path=/{,org/freedesktop/portal/}inputmethod
interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputMethod1
member={CreateInputContext,Version}
peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Fcitx),
dbus (send, receive)
bus=session
path=/{,org/freedesktop/portal/}inputcontext/**
interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext1
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Layout path: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkit2gtk-4.0
"/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkit2gtk-4.0{,/**}" mrwklix,
# Layout path: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkit2gtk-4.1
"/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkit2gtk-4.1{,/**}" mrwklix,
# Layout path: /usr/share/libdrm
"/usr/share/libdrm{,/**}" mrwklix,
# Layout path: /usr/share/xml/iso-codes
"/usr/share/xml/iso-codes{,/**}" mrwklix,
}
Mini Shell