Current File : //usr/share/doc/cryptsetup/Keyring.txt
Integration with kernel keyring service
---------------------------------------
We have two different use cases for kernel keyring service:
I) Volume keys
Since upstream kernel 4.10 dm-crypt device mapper target allows loading volume
key (VK) in kernel keyring service. The key offloaded in kernel keyring service
is only referenced (by key description) in dm-crypt target and the VK is therefore
no longer stored directly in dm-crypt target. Starting with cryptsetup 2.0 we
load VK in kernel keyring by default for LUKSv2 devices (when dm-crypt with the
feature is available).
Currently, cryptsetup loads VK in 'logon' type kernel key so that VK is passed in
the kernel and can't be read from userspace afterwards. Also, cryptsetup loads VK in
the thread keyring (before passing the reference to dm-crypt target) so that the key
lifetime is directly bound to the process that performs the dm-crypt setup. When
cryptsetup process exits (for whatever reason) the key gets unlinked in the kernel
automatically. In summary, the key description visible in dm-crypt table line is
a reference to VK that usually no longer exists in kernel keyring service if you
used cryptsetup for device activation.
Using this feature dm-crypt no longer maintains a direct key copy (but there's
always at least one copy in the kernel crypto layer).
Additionally, libcryptsetup supports the linking of volume keys to
user-specified kernel keyring with crypt_set_keyring_to_link(). The user may
specify keyring name, key type ('user' or 'logon') and key description where
libcryptsetup should link the verified volume key upon subsequent device
activation (or key verification alone).
The volume key(s) (provided the key type is 'user') linked in the user keyring
can be later used to activate the device via crypt_activate_by_keyslot_context()
with CRYPT_KC_TYPE_VK_KEYRING type keyslot context
(acquired by crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_vk_in_keyring()).
Example of how to use volume key linked in custom user keyring from cryptsetup
utility:
1) Open the device and store the volume key to the session keyring:
# cryptsetup open <device> --link-vk-to-keyring "@s::%user:testkey" tst
2) Add a keyslot using the stored volume key in a keyring:
# cryptsetup luksAddKey <device> --volume-key-keyring "%user:testkey"
3) Activate the device using the volume key cached in a keyring ('user' type key)
# cryptsetup open <device> <active_name> --volume-key-keyring "testkey"
II) Keyslot passphrase
The second use case for kernel keyring is to allow cryptsetup reading the keyslot
passphrase stored in kernel keyring instead. The user may load the passphrase in the kernel
keyring and notify cryptsetup to read it from there later. Currently, cryptsetup
cli supports kernel keyring for passphrase only via LUKS2 internal token
(luks2-keyring). The library also provides a general method for device activation by
reading the passphrase from the keyring: crypt_activate_by_keyring(). The key type
for use case II) must always be 'user' since we need to read the actual key
data from userspace unlike with VK in I). The ability to read keyslot passphrases
from kernel keyring also allows easy auto-activate LUKS2 devices.
Simple example of how to use kernel keyring for keyslot passphrase:
1) create LUKS2 keyring token for keyslot 0 (in LUKS2 device/image)
cryptsetup token add --key-description my:key -S 0 /dev/device
2) Load keyslot passphrase in user keyring
read -s -p "Keyslot passphrase: "; echo -n $REPLY | keyctl padd user my:key @u
3) Activate the device using the passphrase stored in the kernel keyring
cryptsetup open /dev/device my_unlocked_device
4a) unlink the key when no longer needed by
keyctl unlink %user:my:key @u
4b) or revoke it immediately by
keyctl revoke %user:my:key
If cryptsetup asks for a passphrase in step 3) something went wrong with keyring
activation. See --debug output then.
Mini Shell